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A Private Sector Solution to a Public Problem
by CHRIS MOLINA*
Introduction
The United States has a gun violence epidemic. In 2010, the
Center for Disease Control reported 31,672 deaths involving the use
of firearms;' roughly one third of those deaths were homicides.2 In
2011, the FBI reported 122,300 robberies and 136,371 aggravated
assaults involving the use of firearms.' The numbers are even more
startling when compared with other developed countries. The
firearm "homicide rate in the U.S. is seven times higher than the
combined homicide rate of 22 other high-income countries."4
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, there
were only eleven intentional homicides committed with firearms in

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
wish to thank Marsha Cohen as well as Joseph Jenkins for their insight, encouragement,
and dedication to students. I also wish to thank Alan Gandler, Michael Torres, and Obi
Ugwu-Oju for their love and support. This article is dedicated to the late Raymond
Olguin.
1.

CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FATAL INJURY REPORTS, NATIONAL AND

REGIONAL, 1999-2010, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html (select
"All Intents" in Box 1; select "Firearm" in Box 2; then click "Submit Request") (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013).
2.

CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FATAL INJURY REPORTS, NATIONAL AND

REGIONAL, 1999-2010, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html (select
"Homicide" in Box 1; select "Firearm" in Box 2; then click "Submit Request") (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013).
3. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: TABLE 15 CRIME TRENDS: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT SELECTED OFFENSES, http://www.

fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table 15 crime
_trends additionalinformation-aboutselectedoffensesbypopulation-group_20102011.xls.
4. Daniel W. Webster et al., The Case for Gun Policy Reforms in America, John
Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research, at 2 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.
jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-andresearch/publications/WhitePaperl02512_CGPR.pdf.
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Japan in 2008; in the United States, the number was 11,0302. England
and Wales saw only thirty-eight homicides committed with firearms;
Australia suffered only thirty-one.'
The pervasiveness of gun violence in the U.S. has been attributed
to the media, economics, the illicit drug trade, general moral decay,
and inadequate mental health resources. Opponents and proponents
of gun control are in sharp disagreement over the extent to which the
availability of guns plays a role in the violence epidemic. Gun control
advocates tend to perceive a positive correlation between the
availability of guns and gun-related violence. Supporters of gun
ownership are diametrically opposed to that notion, arguing that guns
actually make people safer. Both positions probably contain some
truth, although the relative strength of those positions is unclear. The
research surrounding gun violence is hotly contested. Furthermore,
the methods used are somewhat unreliable because of the varied
causes for gun violence. Making empirical assertions requires the
imposition of countless assumptions.
The dearth of reliable
information about gun violence makes it difficult for legislators to
formulate good policy. Whatever the causes are, it is clear that we, as
a country, lack a coherent solution.
There is at least one thing on which both supporters and
opponents of gun control can agree: Certain people should not have
guns. There is little debate, for example, that violent felons should
not have guns. There is at least some consensus that people who
suffer from severe mental illnesses or have substance abuse issues
should not have guns. But where do we draw the line? Should a
person who has been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence be
allowed to own guns? What about a person who merely suffers from
treatable anxiety? A person who has a medical marijuana card?
Assuming, arguendo, that the government could effectively prevent
certain classes of individuals from owning guns, any statutes drawing
bright-line rules would almost certainly be overbroad or
underinclusive. In other words, the government's inability to make
individualized assessments about the risk that certain people pose
implies that legislative generalizations will be wrong when applied to
certain individuals.

5.

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HOMICIDE STATISTICS,

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html
2013).
6. Id.

(last visited Nov. 19,
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Although the government may be unable to make individualized
assessments of gun owners, the insurance industry could make such
assessments, much like it does each time that it decides whether to
insure a new customer. For example, an auto insurance company
must gather certain information before deciding whether to cover a
new driver, and at what premium. The cost of insurance is based
primarily on two factors: the risk the insured poses and the value of
potential liabilities that could result from engaging in activities the
insurance policy covers. Thus, the car insurance company first
determines how likely it is that a driver will cause an accident using
such factors as age, sex, marital status, location, and a driver's history
of accidents and tickets. The company then sets rates based on the
amount of money that would be required to cover the cost of the
damage the insured is likely to cause. This risk-based approach,
combined with a government mandate requiring drivers to purchase
insurance, gives drivers a financial incentive to drive safely and
responsibly.
The government kills two birds with one stone by requiring
drivers to purchase auto insurance. First, it provides a mechanism for
compensating individuals who suffer losses as a result of the insured's
driving. Second, it makes it more expensive for riskier drivers,
thereby providing an economic incentive for the driver to be safer.
Some commentators have suggested that these two objectives,
compensating individuals and incentivizing safer behavior, could be
achieved in the realm of gun control if gun owners were required to
have liability insurance as a precondition to purchase new guns.' The
idea is relatively simple: In order to purchase a gun from a weapons
dealer, the purchaser must show proof of insurance. In order to
purchase a gun from another private individual, the purchaser must
also present proof of insurance. The rates for such insurance would
be based on several risk factors, such as the number of weapons
owned, the type of weapons, and the length of time the purchaser has
owned guns without causing any accidents. Insurance companies will
be left to identify the traits of responsible gun owners. Undoubtedly,
an essential question is whether mandatory insurance for gun owners
infringes on the Second Amendment right to bear arms. This Note

7. See Marsha N. Cohen, Mandatory InsuranceMight Control Guns, SFGATE.COM
(Jan. 10, 2013, 7:43 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Mandatoryinsurance-might-control-guns-4184778.php; John Wasik, Newtown's New Reality, FORBES
(Dec. 17, 2012, 7:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/12/17/newtownsnew-reality-using-liability-insurance-to-reduce-gun-deaths/.
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seeks to address both the advisability of an insurance mandate as a
matter of policy and the constitutional issues such a law might pose.
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I examines the current
gun control debate and our current laws; the inquiry will focus on
what a mandatory insurance law can add to current laws and other
reforms. Part II describes the structure of an insurance mandate and
how it might be implemented. Part III addresses the constitutionality
of an insurance mandate in light the Supreme Court's recent
landmark decision in Districtof Columbia v. Heller.

I.

Gun Control Reforms - Past and Present
On December 14, 2012, after killing his own mother, twentyyear-old Adam Lanza went to Sandy Hook Elementary School, and
committed one of the most heinous school shootings in American
history.! Armed with two semiautomatic handguns, a semi-automatic
rifle, and a bulletproof vest, Lanza murdered twenty children and six
school staff members."o For a moment, the political climate was ripe
for reform. People across the country, including gun owners, were
horrified. Although the tragedy provided the momentum for change,
legislators retreated to polarized camps on the proper course of
action. For example, as Colorado proposed measures expanding
background checks and limiting ammunition magazines to fifteen
rounds," Arkansas passed a bill permitting people to carry a
concealed weapon in churches.12 The discrepancy between these
contradictory approaches to reducing gun violence is the product of
two wholly inconsistent assumptions.
The Colorado proposal
implicitly relies on the assumption that placing limitations on the
availability of guns and ammunition will reduce violence. The
Arkansas approach assumes that expanding the availability of guns
will reduce violence.

8. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
9. Richard Esposito, Candice Smith & Christina Ng, 20 Children Died in Newtown,
Conn., School Massacre, ABC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/twentychildren-died-newtown-connecticut-school-shooting/story?id=17973836.
10. Id.
11. Jack Healy, After Rancorous Debate, Colorado Senate Advances Strict New
Measures on Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/
us/colorado-senate-advances-strict-gun-control-measures.html.
12. Suzie Parker, Law allowing guns in churches signed by Arkansas Governor,
NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2013, 10:53 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.comlnews/2013/02
/11/16930912-law-allowing-guns-in-churches-signed-by-arkansas-governor.
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This section examines the contradictory approaches to regulating
gun ownership with respect to three types of reform proposals. First
is the literature surrounding right-to-carry ("RTC") proposals-socalled "concealed weapons" laws. These laws allow individuals to
possess firearms or other weapons in public in a concealed manner.
Second is current federal law regarding background checks-in
particular, its ineffectiveness on account of the oft-mentioned "gun
show loophole." Third is the issue of assault weapons. The debates
surrounding these reforms will provide useful insight for devising a
holistic approach to solving the gun violence problem.
A. The Classic Gun Control Debate: More Guns or Fewer Guns?

In July 2013, Illinois became the last state in the nation to enact
some type of law allowing individuals to carry guns in public. 3 There
are different variations on the type of RTC in each state.14 Some
states have "shall issue" RTC laws, which grant concealed carry
permits based upon the applicants meeting certain criteria." In "shall
issue" states, the government has no discretionary authority to deny
permits for applicants who meet the specified criteria. In contrast, in
"may issue" states, the decision to grant a permit is left partially in the
discretion of the government and applicants are often asked to show
"good cause," such as the need for self-defense." A few states are
completely unrestricted, meaning that citizens can carry concealed
weapons in public without a permit." The academic literature
surrounding RTC laws points in different directions. One of the most
influential commentators on the subject, economist John Lott, is
largely responsible for the theory that more guns lead to less crime."
Lott's original research relies on county-level crime data from the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports ("UCR") between 1977 and 1992.20
13. Greg McCune, Illinois is last state to allow concealed carry of guns, REUTERS
(July 9, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-usa-guns-illinois-idUSBRE968
0ZB20130709.
14. Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Concealed Weapons Permitting Policy
Summary, (May 21, 2012), http://smartgunlaws.org/concealed-weapons-permitting-policysummary/.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. John R. Lott and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns,26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1997).
20. Id. at 6.

426

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 41:2

Between those years, ten states enacted RTC laws while eight other
states had prior RTC laws. 21 The study concluded that "[w]hen state
concealed handgun law went into effect in a county, murders fell by
7.65 percent, and rapes and aggravated assaults fell by 5 and 7
percent."2 2 Lott's theory won broad support from special interest
groups-notably the NRA 23-but its reception in the academic
community has been mixed.24
Only a year after Lott published his original research on RTC
laws, however, scholars Dan Black and Daniel Nagin reexamined
Lott's own data; they found serious methodological problems and "no
basis for drawing confident conclusions about the impact of RTC laws
on violent crimes." 25 If Lott's theory were correct, then allowing
people to carry guns in public should have the most significant
deterrent effect on crimes involving face-to-face confrontationsespecially those occurring in public.26 In other words, RTC laws
should scare criminals into avoiding confrontation. But, this is not
the case. Critics of Lott's work have shown that a higher incidence of
armed robberies (the crime expected to have the sharpest reduction)
is actually positively correlated with RTC laws.27 In addition, one
might also expect that if RTC laws are responsible for decreases in
crime, there would be a significant number of justifiable homicides,
such as the killing of a felon by a private citizen during the
commission of the felony. However, the UCR data-the same data
upon which Lott relied-shows that between 1998 and 2002, the
average number of justifiable homicides by private citizens with
firearms was only 167 per year, nationwide.28

21. Id. at 12.
22. Id. at 19.
23. NRA Institute for Legislative Action, Right-to-Carry2012, http://www.nraila.org/
gun-laws/articles/2012/right-to-carry-2012.aspx?s="Right-To-Carry"&st=&ps=.
24. Compare Don B. Kates, The Limited Importance of Gun Control from
Criminological Perspective, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 70-71 (Timothy D. Litton ed.,
2005), with ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA, 76-77 (2013).

25.

Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime?,

27 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 218 (1998).

26. See Ian Ayres & John Donohue, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime"
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1259 (2003).
27. Id. at 1266.
28.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE

UNITED STATES - 2002, § 2 at 28 (tbl. 2.17), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime -inthe-u.s/2002 (follow "Section II - Crime Index" hyperlink).
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Despite the shortcomings in Lott's methodology, opponents of
RTC laws are at a slight disadvantage. Over the last several decades,
as an increasing number of states enacted RTC laws, crimes involving
firearms have decreased.2 9 This creates two hurdles for RTC
opponents: First, they must disprove any purported link between
RTC laws and the general reduction in crime; and, second, they must
prove that crime rates would have gone down even further if states
had not enacted RTC laws. Some critics of Lott's work posit
alternative explanations for the unexpected drop in crime rates
during the 1990s. For example, Steven Levitt and John Donohue,
authors of Freakonomics, advance the theory that legalized abortion
is responsible for as much as fifty percent of the drop in crime that
occurred during the 1990s.'
Any attempt to settle the debate over concealed carry laws is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, the lack of scholarly
consensus is unsurprising. Measuring the efficacy of RTC laws based
on the data provided in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports may
expose a correlation between RTC laws and crime, but drawing a
conclusion regarding causation requires unaccounted assumptions.
The FBI data does not provide sufficient descriptive information
regarding the circumstances involved in each crime. For example, the
data fails to show whether the victim had a concealed weapon or
whether the crime was committed in public or private.
Although some might disagree, we lack the appropriate
information to settle the debate over RTC laws. Some might argue
that this is not an accident. Special interest groups, notably the NRA,
have convinced Congress to withhold federal money for research
about gun violence. Particularly, in 1996, a provision was added to
the statute funding the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") that
reads, "[n]one of the funds made available in this title may be used, in
whole or in part, to advocate or promote gun control."" The CDC
interpreted this provision broadly and has avoided gun research

29 D'Vera Cohn et al., Gun Homicide Rate Down 49% Since 1993 Peak; Public
Unaware, Pew Research Center (May 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/05/07/
gun-homicide-rate-down-49-since-1993-peak-public-unaware/.
30. John Donohue & Steven Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 66
Q. J. OF ECON. 379,379 (2001).
31. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 218, 125 Stat. 786,
1085 (2012).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

428

[Vol. 41:2

entirely for nearly two decades.32 However, on January 16, 2013,
President Barack Obama signed a presidential memorandum
directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to conduct or
sponsor research into the causes of gun violence and the ways to
prevent it.33 The presidential memorandum implicitly distinguishes
scientific research from advocacy-the former being permissible and
the latter forbidden by law. However, unless President Obama can
convince Congress to provide additional funding, it is unclear whether
the memorandum will have any effect.'
Until there is a comprehensive study specifically providing the
data necessary to make meaningful observations regarding concealed
carry laws, legislators should wait to make changes to those laws. The
academic literature surrounding RTC laws relies on data that was not
gathered for the purpose of analyzing RTC laws, such as the FBI's
Uniform Crime Reports. As such, the effect of RTC laws remains
unclear.
B. Background Checks: Closing the Gun Show Loophole

Perhaps the least controversial of all the proposals presented to
Congress is the effort to expand background checks. In July 2012, an
organization called Mayors Against Illegal Guns released a survey by
Republican pollster Frank Luntz, which showed that seventy-four
percent of NRA members and eighty-seven percent of non-NRA gun
owners are in favor of requiring criminal background checks on
anyone purchasing a gun.35 Thus, Congress should be able to pass the
expansion of background checks without much opposition.
Generally, current laws require licensed gun dealers to conduct
background checks and keep records about the purchaser and the
firearms sold.36 However, federal law exempts those who are "not
32 JoNel Aleccia, Obama plan eases freeze on CDC gun violence research,
NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/obama-plan-eases-freeze
-cdc-gun-violence-research-1B7999574?franchiseSlug=healthmain.
33.

THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM - ENGAGING IN PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/16/presidential-memorandum-engaging-public-health-research-causes-andpre-0.
34. Brad Plumer, Gun research is allowed again. So what will we find out?, WASH.
POST (Jan. 17, 2013, 12:50 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013
/01/17/gun-research-is-allowed-again-so-what-will-we-find-out/.
http://www.
ILLEGAL GUNS PRESS RELEASE,
35. MAYORS AGAINST
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/media-center/pr006-12.shtml (July 24,2012).
36. 18 U.S.C. §922 (2013).
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engaged in the business" of dealing guns. Private individuals and
dealers who label themselves as occasional sellers can avoid these
requirements."
This is the infamous "Gun Show Loophole."
Although the provision exempting occasional sellers may be an easy
opportunity to avoid background checks, it is unclear how many gun
sales occur without an accompanying background check.3 ' A study
published in 1997 estimated that almost forty percent of gun sales
occur without a background check, but there has been no recent
research on this matter.40
The primary counterargument to expanding the current laws on
background checks is that "criminals do not abide by the law,
anyhow." 41 This argument, although tautological, has some merit. If
someone knows that they will not pass a background check, they are
unlikely to submit to one at all. A report compiled by the United
States Department of Justice states that "[f]rom the inception of the
Brady Act on March 1, 1994, through December 31, 2010, over 118
million applications for firearm transfers or permits were subject to
background checks" and of those, about 2.1 million applications were
denied.42 In 2010 alone, only 73,000 of 10.4 million applications
(1.5%) were denied.43 Although the denial rate appears to be
glaringly ineffective, it demonstrates that at least two million
criminals were imprudent enough to attempt to purchase a firearm
from a federally licensed dealer in the past two decades.' Of course,
37. Id.
38. Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Closing the Gun Show Loophole, http://www.
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/gun-show.shtml.
39. Glen Kessler, The stale claim that 40 percent of gun sales lack background checks,
WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/ post/thestale-claim-that-40-percent-of-gun-sales-lack-background-checks/2013/01/20/e42ecO50629a-1 1e2-b05a-605528f6b712_blog.html.
40. Phillip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on Private
Ownership and Use of Firearms,NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE (May 1997), https:// www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf.
41. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Senate Blocks Drive for Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/us/politics/senate-obama-gun-control.
html?pagewanted=all (Commenting on failed legislation to expand background checks,
Iowa Republican Senator Charles E. Grassley noted that "Criminals do not submit to
background checks now. They will not submit to expanded background checks.").
42. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR FIREARM TRANSFERS,
2010 - STATISTICAL TABLES (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/

bcft10st.pdf.
43. Id.
44. See id. For a list of categories of persons prohibited from receiving a firearm
under the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, see FED. BUREAU OF
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there is no real way to measure the number of criminals who were
actually deterred from purchasing a firearm because of the
background check system. One might presume that criminals smart
enough to avoid a background check might purchase firearms in a
situation that does not require one-for example, from an "occasional
seller" at a gun show.
One limitation of the background check system is the inability to
monitor transfers or sales between private individuals. Federal law
does not require private individuals to record a firearm transfer to
another private individual.45 One can only imagine how onerous of a
task it would be to enforce a law that did require private individuals
to record their sales. However, the fact that private individuals can
make unrecorded firearm transfers without conducting a background
check could undermine the goal of expanding the background check
system because criminals can circumvent the system by buying guns
privately from a "straw." 46 In a press release from the United States
Attorney's Office, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives Special Agent Scott Sweetow conceded that "[n]o one can
accurately tally the total number of firearms straw-purchased in the
U.S. because these violations often go undetected by law enforcement
until the weapons turn up at a crime scene, sometimes months or
years after the purchase." 47 In an ideal world for gun control
advocates, there would be some mechanism for recording person-toperson firearm transfers, but not only would such a law face
extraordinary political opposition, it would be even more difficult to
enforce than existing laws prohibiting straw purchases. The most
practical policy, both politically and in terms of implementation,
would be to close the Gun Show Loophole.
INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK: FAcT SHEET,

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/general-information/fact-sheet (last visited Nov. 19,
2013).
45. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND
EXPLOSIVES, ATF Best Practices: Transfers of Firearms by Private Sellers (Jan. 2013),
http://www.atf.gov/files/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-21.pdf.
46. A "straw purchase" is "the acquisition of a firearm from a federally licesnsed
firearms dealer by an individual (the "straw") for the purpose of concealing the true
identity of the intended receiver of the firearm(s)." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Reducing
Illegal Firearms Trafficking (July 2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/
180752.pdf.
47.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND

EXPLOSIVES, New York Man Sentenced To Prison In Connection With "Straw Purchases"
of Approximately 16 Firearms in Georgia (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.atf.gov/press/
releases/2011/08/082911-atl-new-york-man-sentenced-to-prison-in-connection-with-strawpurchases-of-approximately-16-firearms-in-georgia.html.
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As will be discussed infra, a background check will be a
necessary component of any insurance mandate, since the
administrative task of enforcing the mandate will likely need to
piggyback on the FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check
System or the designated state Point of Contact.
Although
background checks may have little effect on straw purchases, an
insurance mandate could provide an incentive for gun owners to
report transfers or sales to their insurance providers. After all, if an
insurance premium is based, in part, on the number of weapons a
person owns, the owner would have a financial incentive to report a
change in ownership of his or her firearms in order to reduce the cost
of insurance.
C. Limiting the Availability of Assault Weapons and High Capacity
Magazines

Although there is some bipartisan consensus about expanding
background checks, there is less agreement about banning more
powerful assault weapons.' The argument in favor of banning assault
weapons is premised on the idea that more powerful firearms enable
criminals to do more destruction. 49 However, gun control opponents
respond that the vast majority of firearm homicides are not
committed with assault weapons.so For example, of the 12,664 firearm
homicides committed in the United States in 2011, only 323 were
committed with "rifles""-a classification that encompasses the vast
majority of assault weapons. In contrast, 6,220 firearm homicides
were committed with handguns.52 Those who oppose a ban on assault
weapons argue that because the percentage of homicides committed
with rifles is so low, an assault weapons ban would be ineffective to

48. Carolyn Lochhead, Feinstein Assault Weapons Ban Defeated, SFGATE.COM
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Feinstein-assault-weapons-bandefeated-4443319.php.
49. C.S. Koper and J.A. Roth, The Impact of the 1994 FederalAssault Weapon Ban
on Gun Violence Outcomes: An Assessment of Multiple Outcome Measures and Some
Lessons for Policy Evaluation, 17 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 33, 38 (2001).
50. Brad Plumer, Everything you need to know about the assault weapons ban, in one
post, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2012/12/17/everything-you-need-to-know-about-banning-assault-weapons-in-one-post.
51. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: TABLE 20 MURDER BY STATE, TYPES OF WEAPONS (2011), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/

crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-20.
52. Id.
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combat gun violence." However, this argument overlooks the fact
that the definition of assault weapons includes semiautomatic
handguns and excludes rifles without semiautomatic capabilities. In
addition, it ignores the fact that the number assault weapons may
account for only a small percentage of all guns in circulation. The
exact number of assault weapons currently in circulation is unknown,
but some studies suggest that of the 192 million firearms in circulation
when the 1994 Assault Weapons Ban took effect, only 1.5 million
were assault weapons. 14
Gun rights activists are inconsistent about what the ultimate goal
of gun control should be. When talking about expanding universal
background checks, they argue that background checks would not
have prevented tragedies like the Sandy Hook shooting because the
shooter, Adam Lanza, never purchased the firearms." Although true,
when gun control advocates point out that an assault weapons ban
might have stopped Adam Lanza, opponents respond that such a
measure would have an insignificant impact on crime overall.
Coming up with measures that gun rights activists will uniformly
support is like shooting at a moving target because they reject
proposals based on the fact that they don't solve the "real" problem.
For example, in response to the Sandy Hook tragedy, the NRA
assembled a taskforce of security experts to assess the safety and
emergency preparedness of schools around the country.57 The
report's primary recommendation was to provide training for armed
personnel at schools." The merits of that recommendation are
beyond the scope of this Note, but it is noteworthy that the NRA
narrowly confined its report to the issue of school safety. That is, the
NRA chose to focus only on school safety, instead of addressing gun
control in the context of all forms of gun violence. Improving school
safety is undoubtedly a laudable goal. But why stop there?

53. Jeffry Bartash, 'Assault' rifles are not involved in many U.S. murders: A look at
the data, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 16, 2013), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/capitolreport/
2013/01/16/assault-rifles-are-not-involved-in-many-u-s-murders-a-look-at-the-data/.
54. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION 7-8 (Nov. 14,2012).
55. Joe Johns & Stacey Samuel, Would background checks have stopped recent mass
shootings? Probably not, CNN (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/10/politics/
background-checks-mass-shootings/.
56. Plumer, supra note 50.
57. The Nat'l Sch. Shield, Report of the National School Task Force (Apr. 2, 2013),
availableat http://www.nraschoolshield.com/NSSFinal.pdf.
58. Id. at 15.
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In 2012, James Holmes killed 12 and wounded 58 people in a
movie theater using the same gun-an AR-15-that Adam Lanza
used in the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting." Moreover,
Holmes obtained the assault rifle legally.W Applying the same logic as
that of the NRA's taskforce report following the Sandy Hook
shooting, theaters should also provide armed personnel. In the words
of NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre, "[t]he only thing
that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun."61 While that
statement may contain some emotional appeal, it ignores the fact that
a good guy with a gun is at a disadvantage if the bad guy has a more
powerful gun. Admittedly, this argument is purely anecdotal, much
like LaPierre's, but it is worth pointing out that although an assault
weapons ban might not prevent these types of shootings, it could
reduce the number of lives lost.
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence surrounding assault
weapons bans, like other gun control issues, is not very helpful.
Although assault weapons are particularly suitable for mass
shootings, fatalities from mass shootings only average 35 fatalities per
year.62 One might have hoped that the Federal Assault Weapons ban
passed during the Clinton administration would have yielded some
instructive data, but that is not the case. A provision of the bill
required the Attorney General to evaluate the effects of the ban after
its passage, but limited the duration of the study to eighteen months.63
59. Erica Goode, Rifle Used in Killings, America's Most Popular, Highlights
Regulation Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/us/
lanza-used-a-popular-ar-15-style-rifle-in-newtown.html.
Holmes entered a Colorado
movie theater through an exit door wearing what police described as "ballistics gear."
After the shooting, Holmes was detained outside of the theater standing by his car. Id.
See also Dan Frosch and Kirk Johnson, Gunman Kills 12 in Colorado, Reviving Gun
Control Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/us/
shooting-at-colorado-theater-showing-batman-movie.html. Authorities recovered an AR15 assault rifle, a Remington 12-gauge shotgun, and two.40 caliber Glock handguns. Id.
60. Nick Carbone, Colorado Theater Shooter Carried4 Guns, All Obtained Legally,
TIME NEWSFEED (July 21, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/07/21/colorado-theatershooter-carried-4-guns-all-obtained-legally.
61. Sean Sullivan, NRA's Wayne LaPierre:Put 'armed police officers' in every school,
WASH. PosT (Dec. 1, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics
/wp/2012/12/21/nras-wayne-lapierre-put-armed-police-officers-in-every-school/.
62. Greg Ridgeway, Summary of Select Firearm Violence Prevention Strategies,
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/media/10883516/nij-gunpolicy-memo.pdf ("mass shooting" defined as a shooting consisting of "four or more
victims in a particular place and time").
63. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103d
Cong. § 110104 ("The study shall be conducted over a period of 18 months, commencing
12 months after the date of enactment of this Act.").
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When the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ") issued its findings, it
explained that the data suggested "a short-term decrease in criminal
use of the banned weapons," but conceded that the limited timeframe
of the study restricted "the ability of statistical tests to discern impacts
that may be meaningful from a policy perspective."" The NIJ did not
release another report until July 2004, which, for unknown reasons,
the Department of Justice did not publish.5 The report summarized
that although gun homicides plummeted by about thirty-eight percent
between 1994 and 1999, the drop was probably better attributed to
other factors, such as "changing drug markets, a strong economy,
better policing, and higher incarceration rates.""
A separate, but related, issue that arises in the debate of
reinstituting an assault weapons ban is limiting high capacity
magazines. The Sandy Hook shooter, Adam Lanza, used magazines
holding thirty rounds each 7 and the Aurora shooter, James Holmes,
used a 100-round drum magazine." Limiting high-capacity magazines
may have a more observable effect on crime than a prohibition on
assault weapons for two reasons. First, large capacity magazines can
be used in both assault rifles and handguns, so limiting magazine size
would impact a broader range of firearms. As previously mentioned,
the vast majority of firearm homicides are committed with handguns,
presumably because they are easy to conceal and handle. Second, a
shooter limited to ten rounds per magazine (the 1994 Ban's limit) is
forced to change magazine clips more often. It only takes a few
seconds to change clips, but as one Sandy Hook victim's father told
CBS' 60 Minutes in an interview, "[i]f you have to change magazines
15 times instead of five times, there are three times as many instances
where something could jam, something could be bobbled, you just
increase the time for intervention, you increase the timeframe for
kids to get out." 69 However, the argument cuts both ways in the
64. Jeffrey A. Roth & Christopher S. Koper, Impacts of the 1994 Assault Weapons
Ban: 1994-96, at 9, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl
/173405.pdf.
65. Christopher S. Koper, Daniel J. Woods & Jeffrey A. Roth, Updated Assessment
of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, 1994-2003, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (June 2004),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/204431.pdf.
66. Id. at 91-92.
67. Plumer, supra note 50.
68. Goode, supranote 59.
69. S.H. Blannelberry, The Argument Against Banning 'High' Capacity Magazines,
GUNS.COM (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.guns.com/2013/04/05/the-argument-against-banning
-high-capacity-magazines-video/.
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minds of gun rights activists: Someone using a firearm for legitimate
defensive purposes will be mutually disadvantaged by a limitation on
clip size.
It is difficult to engage in an analysis of these issues without
resorting to anecdotal arguments. And, unfortunately, anecdotal
arguments are unlikely to shift the political balance in any given
direction. Such arguments tend to be circumstantial or fact specificand not necessarily representative. It is simply too easy to imagine a
scenario that will contradict an anecdotal argument. On the other
hand, reliable empirical assertions require much more data because
trends or patterns can be proven only after controlling for other
variables. The assault weapons ban and high-capacity magazine bans
only lasted ten years. This might seem like enough time to gather
data, but not for a law like the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, which did nothing about the estimated 270
million guns already in circulation in the United States."o
Due to the lack of conclusive evidence regarding the actual
impact of the 1994 assault weapons ban, the controversy over assault
weapons will undoubtedly continue. This Note proposes that an
insurance mandate should be considered in the absence of an assault
weapons ban. An insurance mandate could have a similar effect as an
assault weapons ban: If the price of an insurance policy is tied to the
lethality of the insured's weapons, there would be a financial
incentive to avoid purchasing assault weapons and high-capacity
magazines.
D. A Holistic Approach to Gun Control Reform

One of the core principles in the field of public health is that
"multiple strategies directed toward different risk factors are
necessary to solve the problem."7 This principle is applicable to the
debate on gun violence. The complexity of the issue makes it unlikely
that any single reform measure is capable of independently solving
the problem. An insurance mandate for gun owners cannot be a
panacea for gun violence on its own. As such, the idea of mandatory
insurance should be considered alongside other potential reforms for
the sake of determining what, if anything, it adds to other proposals.
70. Aaron Karp, Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms, SMALL ARMS SURVEY
2007: GUNS AND THE CITY 39, 47, available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/
publications/by-type/ yearbook/small-arms-survey-2007.html.
71. David Henenway, The Public Health Approach to Reducing Firearm Injury and
Violence, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 635, 649 (2006).
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In analyzing the potential efficacy of gun control measures, it is
abundantly clear that any measure, standing alone, is insufficient to
have a meaningful impact on overall levels of gun violence.
Piecemeal legislation that does not include comprehensive reforms
will not solve the problem. For example, prohibiting the sale and
manufacture of assault weapons can only have a marginal impact
because of the existing stockpile of assault weapons already in
circulation. If, however, an assault weapons ban was coupled with a
gun buyback program, then it could potentially have a greater impact.
Universal background checks, standing alone, cannot do much about
the straw purchase issue since there is no requirement for individuals
to keep records of purchases. However, expanding background
checks could be more effective if individuals were required to sell
their guns using a federally licensed firearms dealer as an
intermediary.
None of these reforms, however, effectively distinguishes
between safe gun owners and unsafe gun owners. For example,
background checks may stop someone with a history of violence from
purchasing a gun, but they will not stop someone who has only a
predisposition for violent behavior. James Holmes, having no
criminal record, purchased firearms legally before carrying out the
Aurora theater shooting.72 Each of the reforms mentioned supra
involves drawing bright-line rules that could either keep guns away
from lawful owners or allow guns to fall into the hands of unlawful
owners. In contrast, an insurance-based approach could provide a
mechanism for assessing gun owners on an individualized basis to
determine the actual risk posed to others.
II. Designing an Insurance Mandate
The idea of imposing an insurance mandate on gun owners is at
least twenty-five years old. The earliest mention of the idea is found
in an Alabama Law Review article written in 1987 by one of today's
preeminent scholars of Second Amendment jurisprudence, Professor
Nelson Lund." Professor Lund's article was devoted to articulating
an interpretation of the Second Amendment that is suitable to
modern conditions and consistent with the Supreme Court's
72. Nick Carbone, Colorado Theater Shooter Carried 4 Guns, All Obtained Legally,
TIME NEWSFEED (July 21, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/07/21/colorado-theatershooter-carried-4-guns-all-obtained-legally.
73. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to SelfPreservation,39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 128 (1987).
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treatment of other individual rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 74
At the outset, Professor Lund rejected the idea that the right to bear
arms is a collective right-that is, that the right "is restricted to
officially organized military units."7 A little over twenty years later,
the Supreme Court also rejected the collective right theory, holding
that the Second Amendment protects an "individual right to possess
and carry weapons in case of confrontation."7 Beginning with the
proposition that the Second Amendment protects the individual right
to bear arms, Professor Lund concluded that mandatory insurance for
gun owners would be an effective policy for reducing gun violence
and that such a law would pass constitutional muster under an
individual rights framework.
Before exploring the veracity of
Professor Lund's prediction in the wake of the Heller decision, it is
necessary to consider more fully how an insurance mandate might
work and how it would be implemented.
A. Overview of Liability Insurance

This section begins with a discussion of certain insurance policies
that already cover costs related to firearm injuries. This is followed
by a discussion of proposed insurance mandates that have been made
at the state level. Before discussing the relative merits of an
insurance mandate, this section makes some estimates about the costs
of gun insurance.
1.

CurrentlyAvailable Insurance Policies

A number of reputable insurance companies already offer
liability insurance for gun owners, although such coverage is simply
part of a more expansive homeowner's or renter's insurance policy.78
These insurance policies cover liability in the event of an accident
involving the homeowner's firearm and typically cost between $130
and $300 per year. In general, liability insurance does not cover
intentional violations of the law. After the Columbine High School
shootings in 1999, however, in which two high school seniors
74. Id. at 103-04.
75. Id. at 106.
76. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
77. See Lund, supra note 73.
78. Insurance Information Network of California, Homeowner Insurance: Gun
Liability (Feb. 2013), http://www.iinc.org/articles/460/1/Homeowner-Insurance-GunLiability/Pagel.html.
79. Id.
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murdered twelve and injured twenty-four students, the two assailants'
families were able to settle claims brought by some of the victims'
families using money from their homeowner's insurance policies."
Yet, generally, in order for the insurance company to indemnify the
insured, the injury must be an accident. For example, the NRA
provides a number of insurance products that cover personal liability,
but coverage applies only if the accident occurs while the firearm is
being used for hunting or self-defense." The annual premium for the
basic policy is $47, which buys a $100,000 coverage limit." The annual
premium for its most expensive policy is $200, which buys a $1 million
coverage limit. Members can purchase an additional rider to cover
liabilities related to self-defense for an additional $118.83 The NRAendorsed insurance programs are poor models for the type of
insurance that would be needed under an insurance mandate because
they are ridden with exemptions from coverage. A meaningful
insurance mandate would require gun owners to purchase insurance
policies that cover liability resulting from tortious conduct.
2.

Legislative Proposals

To date, no state has enacted an insurance mandate for gun
owners, but several states have proposed legislation that would act as
insurance mandates. The following language is an excerpt from
proposed legislation currently pending in the Illinois General
Assembly:
Any person who owns a firearm in this State shall
maintain a policy of liability insurance in the amount
of at least $1,000,000 specifically covering any damages
resulting from negligent or willful acts involving the
use of such firearm while it is owned by such person.
A person shall be deemed the owner of a firearm after
the firearm is lost or stolen until such loss or theft is
80. Michael Janofsky, $2.53 Million Deal Ends Some Columbine Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/us/2.53-million-deal-ends-some
-columbine-lawsuits.html.
81. See NRA Member Benefits, http://membership.nrahq.org/benefits.asp. See also
The NRA Endorsed Property & Casualty Insurance Program, http://www.locktonrisk.com
/nrains/Excess.htm.
82. The NRA Endorsed Property & Casualty Insurance Program, https://nrains.
locktonaffinity.com/Coverage.aspx?pID=7235.
83. See The NRA Endorsed Property & Casualty Insurance Program, https://nrains.
locktonaffinity.com/Coverage.aspx?pID=2697.
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reported to the police department or sheriff of the
jurisdiction in which the owner resides.'
A similar bill has been introduced in State Senate of New York:
Any person in this state who shall own a firearm
shall, prior to such ownership, obtain and continuously
maintain a policy of liability insurance in an amount
not less than one million dollars specifically covering
any damages resulting from any negligent or willful
acts involving the use of such firearm while it is owned
by such person. Failure to maintain such insurance
shall result in the immediate revocation of such
owner's registration, license and any other privilege to
own such firearm.
For purposes of this section, a person shall be
deemed to be the owner of a firearm if such firearm is
lost or stolen until such loss or theft is reported to the
police department or sheriff which has jurisdiction in
the county, town, city or village in which such owner
resides.
Any person who owns a firearm on the effective
date of this section shall obtain the insurance required
by this section within thirty days of such effective
date. 5
Each of these proposals contains similar provisions with respect
to coverage. Both proposals require the gun owner to purchase a
policy worth at least $1 million. In addition, the proposals require the
gun owner to purchase insurance that covers both negligent and
willful acts. It is important to note that both statutes are written to
require gun owners to purchase insurance that covers the acts of
others. It does not matter that someone other than the gun owner
causes injury with the owner's gun: The insurance must compensate
for losses caused by the gun and not merely by the gun owner. In the
same vein, if the gun is lost or stolen, the gun owner's insurance
would nevertheless cover injuries caused by it. The gun owner can
avoid future liability only by reporting the theft or loss to the proper
authorities.
84.
85.

S.B. 1935, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
S.B. 3853, 236th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
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The only significant difference between the two proposals is that
the New York proposal specifically lists the consequences of failing to
maintain the insurance policy." Under the New York proposal,
failure to maintain the insurance policy would result in a revocation
of the owner's "registration, license, or other privilege" to own such a
firearm. This provision presupposes that the owner would need to
register, obtain a license, or have some other privilege to own the
firearm. It is unclear what the bill's proponents intended by including
this provision, but it suggests that the legislature might also wish to
require gun owners to register their guns.
3.

Cost of Insuring Gun Owners

Each of the legislative proposals mentioned above requires gun
owners to purchase insurance policies with at least $1 million in
coverage. This provides one clue as to what such insurance might
cost. Another clue is the aggregate societal costs of firearm injuries
and deaths. The Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation
estimates that the aggregate total cost of firearm injuries and deaths
amounted to more than $174 billion in 2010.8 The cost is staggering,
which raises the question as to whether $1 million is actually enough.
The answer depends on the nature of the injury. The average societal
cost per injury resulting in an emergency room visit is $116,372; being
admitted to the hospital costs $426,200; and a fatality results in a
$4,699,759 bill.' So, while a $1 million coverage limit would be
sufficient to cover the costs associated with a serious firearm injury, it
would be wholly insufficient to cover the average cost of a fatality.
This may be.a consequence that advocates of insurance mandates will
have to accept, considering that most victims of firearm violence
generally are uncompensated in the first place.
It might be reasonable to base a lower estimate of aggregate
societal cost on the average societal cost per gun, which came out to
about $645 in 2010.89 This is a crude estimate. Insurance costs for gun
owners may turn out to be even lower, since the average cost per gun
figure includes costs that would not be compensated for by insurance

86. Id.
87. Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, Societal Cost per Firearm Injury,
United States, 2010, available at http://www.pire.org/documents/GSWcost201O.pdf ("The
costs include medical and mental health care costs, criminal justice costs, wage losses, and
the value of pain, suffering and lost quality of life.").
88. Id.
89. Id.
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companies, such as societal costs related to firearm suicides or other
governmental costs such as lost tax revenue. However, if insurance
costs were tied purely to societal costs per gun, a gun owner with only
one firearm would pay only $645 per year, or $53.75 per month.
Of course, costs could be greater for people who pose a greater
risk to society. Much like auto insurance, the insurance industry
could devise certain criteria for assessing risk and use the criteria to
make upward or downward departures in price. Such factors might
include the type and number of weapons owned, whether the owner
can demonstrate the ability to secure weapons safely with adequate
gun storage, whether the owner has children in the home, and
whether the owner has been trained properly with respect to the use
and safety of guns." Other criteria common in the automotive
insurance industry may also factor into determining a particular
individual's risk, such as age, gender, past history, or place of
residence. The cost for an elderly woman living in a remote area
possessing only a single pistol capable of holding six rounds may be
negligible. On the other hand, a nineteen-year-old living in an
apartment in a high crime area of a major metropolitan city would
likely have a difficult time affording insurance. However, showing
proof of a mental evaluation and completion of safety classes could
significantly reduce insurance costs for the nineteen-year old.
B. The Merits of an Insurance Mandate
1.

PotentialBenefits

a. Incentivized Responsible Behavior and Victim Compensation
An insurance mandate may have potential benefits that other
gun reforms do not. Two of those potential benefits have already
been discussed: incentivizing responsible gun ownership and
compensating victims. If the price of insurance is tied to the risk
posed by the gun owner, then, in theory at least, the mandate creates
an economic incentive for gun owners to be responsible. People
might be dissuaded from purchasing stockpiles or obtaining more
dangerous weapons like semiautomatic handguns. Further, if the
mandate were implemented in such a way that requires sellers to
verify proof of insurance before making the sale, gun owners would

90. Ian Simpson, Lawmakers propose liability insurance for U.S. gun owners,
REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/06/us-usa-gunsinsurance-idUSBRE91516920130206.
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be unable to avoid the increased costs associated with owning more
dangerous weapons. At the same time, the mandate would ensure
that more victims are compensated for their losses.
b. Reduced Costs for the Healthcare System
Liability insurance for gun owners could also reduce the cost of
healthcare in general. The healthcare costs related to acute gun
injuries are often paid directly by public financing-if at all. The
costs are absorbed by society because uncompensated care results in
an increase in payment rates for everyone. It is estimated that
uncompensated care for firearm victims leads to an increase of $9,209
per person." While private sources, victims, and insurance companies
cover about half of the lifetime costs of gunshot wounds, taxpayers
end up covering the other half, which amounts to about $1.1 billion.'
Admittedly, the extent to which an insurance mandate might reduce
the cost of healthcare is predicated on two assumptions: first, that a
perpetrator can be identified; and second, that such a perpetrator will
have insurance coverage. The hope is that in the long run, guns will
be less likely to end up in the hands of the wrong people.
c. Increased Gun Data
Another potential benefit of an insurance mandate would be the
production of carefully documented information on gun ownership.
Out of necessity, insurance companies would generate massive
volumes of business records that would be much more detailed than
the FBI's crime reports. Insurance records would be a treasure trove
for researchers. Presently, most gun research is based on surveys with
relatively low samples sizes. Surveys about gun ownership are
particularly troublesome because general surveys about controversial
topics may elicit unreliable responses." The insurance industry's
business records would provide much better information for
researchers.
91. Hugh Waters, et al., The economic dimensions of interpersonalviolence, DEP'T
OF INJURIES AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION, WORLD HEALTH ORG. x, xi (2004), available
at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241591609.pdf.
92. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The costs of gun violence against children, in 12
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 87, 90, (2002), available at http://futureofchildren.org
/futureofchildren/publications/docs/12_02_FullJournal.pdf.
93. See Robert Farley et al., Gun Rhetoric vs. Gun Facts, FAcTCHECK.ORG (Dec. 20,
2012), http://factcheck.org/2012/12/gun-rhetoric-vs-gun-facts/ (referring to Economics
professor Carlisle Moody's belief that "[pleople today are simply more likely to tell
survey-takers they do not own a gun ... because it is less socially acceptable").
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Furthermore, the additional information the insurance industry
would yield may also assist law enforcement in cracking down on
straw purchases. Laws that prohibit straw purchases are difficult to
enforce mostly because it is difficult to catch people in the act.
However, an insurance mandate could prevent unlawful transfers by
making it difficult for the transferor to avoid scrutiny. For example,
assume that Mrs. Winchester wants to purchase ten guns that she
intends to sell unlawfully. Before purchasing the guns, she would
need to present proof of insurance to the seller. The seller would
then be required to verify her insurance and remit evidence of the
sale to the insurance company. If Mrs. Winchester would like to
transfer ownership, she would need to inform her insurance company.
If she does not inform her insurance company of the transfer, she will
be forced to pay insurance at a higher rate since the insurance
company will assume she still owns ten guns. Unless she claims that
the guns were lost or stolen, Mrs. Winchester will not be able to avoid
paying the higher premiums. If Mrs. Winchester claims that she lost
ten guns, surely the authorities will be suspicious. Thus, if Mrs.
Winchester truly wishes to be a straw purchaser, her alternatives are
to continue paying insurance on the resold guns or arouse the
suspicions of the authorities.
2.

PotentialCriticisms

a. Disparate Impact on the Poor
Critics of the insurance mandate may attack the law on a number
of different grounds. For example, they might claim that such a law
will disproportionately affect the poor and hinder their ability to
defend themselves.94 This criticism overlooks the fact that guns are
already fairly expensive, at least when purchased directly from a
dealer. The suggested retail price for a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson
handgun, the cheapest firearm advertised on their website, is $449."9
The suggested retail price for the cheapest pistol sold by Colt is $649,

94. NRA Institute for Legislative Action, Outrageous Anti-Gun Bill Proposed in the
Land of Lincoln!, (Feb. 2009), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/2009/2/
outrageous-anti-gun-bill-proposed-in-th.aspx?s=illinois+and+insurance+and+liability&
amp;st=&amp;ps=.
95. Smith & Wesson, http://www.smith-wesson.com (follow "Handguns" hyperlink
for pricing information) (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
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and the next cheapest pistol is $928." In addition, ammunition can be
fairly expensive as well, sometimes costing more than a dollar per
round." Professor Lund anticipated the argument that an insurance
mandate might discriminate against the poor, but dismissed it stating
"[t]here is some truth in this objection, but it could be applied as
easily to any other commodity that is distributed by means of the
price mechanism-for example, automobiles, burglar alarms, or
watch dogs."" The research for this Note has not revealed any
Second Amendment challenges against ammunition and weapons
dealers for setting their prices too high. The point is that there will be
an added cost to owning a gun; however, that cost is not outrageous
when compared with other costs incidental to gun ownership.
b. Compliance
As with any gun control proposal, proponents will have to
respond to the usual argument that criminals, by definition, do not
follow the law.? But the compliance issue is more complicated in the
context of an insurance mandate. For example, assume that a
criminal complies with an insurance mandate and then willfully
commits a robbery. Would insurance pay his court fees? Surely it
would not. Would insurance provide any criminal restitution and
compensate the victim for his losses? It is not clear. These are some
very practical issues that would need to be worked out in the
legislature.
c. Incentivizing Reckless Behavior
The policy goals behind an insurance mandate are based, in part,
on the idea that requiring gun owners to purchase insurance gives
them a "financial incentive to think about and implement safety
measures, some of which would surely be developed in response to
Although most people who
insurance-cost-driven demand."0
commit crimes with guns are likely not thinking about insurance costs
(and it is unlikely that they will purchase insurance in the first place),

96. Colt Manufacturing Company, 2013 Retail Price List, http://www.coltsmfg.com
/Catalog/ColtPistols.aspx (PDF listed at bottom of page as "2013 Retail Price List") (last
visited Oct. 6, 2013).
97. The Sportsman's Guide, Pistol Ammo, https://www.sportsmansguide.com/net/
browse/pistol-ammo.aspx?c=95&stk=1 (last visited on Oct. 6, 2013).
98. Lund, supra note 73, at 130 n.60.
99. See, e.g., Weisman, supra note 41.
100. Cohen, supra note 7.
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for law-abiding gun owners, insurance would at least provide an
incentive to take precautions against accidental firearm injuries.
III. The Constitutionality Of Imposing An Insurance Mandate
On Gun Owners
A. Background and Case Law
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
- U.S. CONST. amend II
The text of the Second Amendment is one of the most
problematic enigmas for both historians and lawyers. Aside from the
academic controversy surrounding the meaning of the Second
Amendment, only rarely has the Supreme Court interpreted its
meaning. Before 2008, the Supreme Court had not addressed the
amendment's meaning since 1939 in United States v. Miller,1o0-and

even then it did so only briefly. In Miller, the Court held that the
National Firearms Act of 1934," which required certain types of
weapons to be registered, did not violate the Constitution because the
weapon at issue, a sawed-off shotgun, lacked a "reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia."'03 This holding is essentially meaningless today since shortbarreled shotguns are common in military use." However, circuit
courts faced with Second Amendment challenges have cited Miller
for the proposition that the amendment "either applies only to the
states' rights to maintain militias, or requires an individual to
demonstrate a reasonable relationship between his possession of a
weapon and 'the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated

101. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
102. National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (superseded by the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939; codified at ch. 53 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954;
codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 5801-72 (2013)).
103. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
104. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (rejecting Miller's
reasoning as "outdated" since almost all small firearms may be useful in modern warfare),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943).
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militia.""'o The idea that the Second Amendment only protects rights
associated with militias is called the "collective rights" theory.
The Supreme Court rejected the collective rights theory in
District of Columbia v. Heller, holding that the Second Amendment
protects an individual's right to possess a firearm irrespective of one's
affiliation with a militia, as well as the right to use firearms for lawful
purposes, such as self-defense within the home.'O Heller involved a
police officer who challenged a District of Columbia law that made it
a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibited the
registration of handguns.'" Taken together, the two provisions of the
law effectively operated as a de facto handgun ban. The Court struck
down the law as a violation of the Second Amendment.as
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia provided an
extensive historical analysis of the meaning of the Second
Amendment. Justice Scalia's originalist interpretation relied on a
historical inquiry into the meaning of the Constitution as it would
have been understood at the time of ratification. The central task
before the Court was to determine whether the Second Amendment's
prefatory clause controlled its operative clause." Specifically, the
issue was whether the "right to bear arms" was limited by the phrase
"a well regulated militia.",o If the prefatory clause was controlling,
then the Amendment would only protect the right to bear arms
related to militia purposes."' Justice Scalia explained that the
prefatory clause announces a purpose, but that the purpose does not
limit or expand the scope of the right.n2 In his view, the Second
Amendment codified a pre-existing right, the right to use firearms for
defensive purposes.'
Interestingly, Justice Scalia relied on post-ratification statements
to justify his interpretation of the Second Amendment.1 4 However,
as Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the Court's
105.
Sources
(2008).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Adam Small, Reviving "Law Office History": How Academic and Historical
Influence Second Amendment Jurisprudence,45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1213, 1217
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573-626 (2008).
D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
Id. at 577-78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 598-602.
Id. at 605-19.

Winter 20141

A PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTION

447

reliance on post-ratification statements is "particularly puzzling"
since they are "generally viewed as the least reliable source of
authority for the intent of any provision's drafters.""' As an
originalist, one would expect Justice Scalia to have confined his
analysis to pre-ratification sources of authority. Yet, Justice Scalia
relied on several historical authorities, both pre- and post-ratification,
and made no attempt to address the veracity of scholars who have
reached the opposite conclusion about the meaning of the Second
Amendment-i.e., a collective right interpretation. For example, in
2002, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion after an
extensive and thoroughly researched examination of the historical
record surrounding the adoption of the Second Amendment."6 In
criticizing Justice Stevens' dissent, Justice Scalia balked at "the
proposition, unsupported by any evidence, that different people of
the founding period had vastly different conceptions of rights to keep
and bear arms."" As a general matter, this cannot possibly be true.
1.

The Absence of a ClearAnalytical Framework

In addition to the interpretational issues, Heller provides little
guidance for future courts considering Second Amendment
challenges. The decision clarified that the Second Amendment
protects an individual's right to bear arms for the purpose of selfdefense, but it failed to articulate why it protects that right. Instead of
attempting to provide an analytical framework to determine the
scope of the Amendment, the Court merely articulated a list of laws
that are presumptively valid, such as laws prohibiting felons or the
mentally ill from owning guns."' The list creates even more confusion
because the presumptively valid laws mentioned cannot be supported
by the logic used to invalidate the handgun ban. If the core right that
the Second Amendment protects is the right to use a gun for selfdefense, then how can the Court justify disallowing the mentally ill
from defending themselves? While prohibiting felons from owning a
115. Id. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) ("the Second Amendment
affords only a collective right to own or possess guns or other firearms").
117. Heller, 554 U.S. at 604-05.
118. Id. at 626-27 ("Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis
today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.").
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gun may seem like good policy, the justification for such a prohibition
loses its appeal when applied to nonviolent felons convicted of crimes
of tax evasion or insider trading."' The Court makes no attempt to
explain why the laundry list of presumptively valid laws are
constitutional despite the fact that during the nation's founding era,
there were no laws prohibiting the mentally ill or convicted felons
-120
from owning guns.
Although it is unclear what type of analysis to apply in future
cases, the Court provided some guidance on what type of analysis not
to apply. The Court opted against a rational basis test.121 Under a
rational basis test, a handgun ban would be upheld if the government
could demonstrate that the ban was rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. The Court further rejected an interestbalancing test, 22 although Justice Scalia implicitly applied an interestbalancing test when he analyzed why Americans prefer handguns to
Regardless, since Heller, Second
rifles for self-defense.123
thr
124
Amendment challenges have flooded lower courts, and there has
been a lack of uniformity in the way those cases have been decided.
a. Divergent Circuit Court Interpretations of Heller
Most courts, relying in part on the presumptively lawful dicta,
have analogized various challenged statutes to those enumerated on
the laundry list.125 Some courts have rejected this analogy approach,
requiring gun laws to have an independent justification under some
form of intermediate scrutiny.126 Under the analogy approach, courts
generally look to one of the prohibitions on the list, such as the
prohibition against felons, and uphold statutes that are more narrowly
defined than those. For example, in United States v. White, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits violent
119. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 221 (2013).
120. Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1551, 1563 (2009).
121. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
122. Id. at 634-35.
123. Id. at 628.
124. Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, The Second Amendment Battleground:
Victories in the Courts and Why they Matter (June 2012) http://smartgunlaws.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/web-victories-in-the-courts.pdf ("Since Heller, federal and state
courts have issued over 600 decisions on Second Amendment challenges nationwide").
125. Winkler, supra note 120, at 1566-67.
126. See United States v. Skoien (Skoien I), 587 F.3d 803, 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2009),
vacated, No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010); see also United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010).
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felons from transporting firearms in interstate commerce, because the
law was narrower than the presumptively valid Section 922(g)(1),
which prohibits both violent and nonviolent felons from owning
127
guns.
The Seventh Circuit, ruling on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), reached the
same result, but for a different reason in United States v. Skoien
("Skoien I").128 In Skoien I, the court devised a two-part test. 129 First,
the court called for a determination of whether the regulated conduct
was protected by the Second Amendment, as it was understood at the
time of ratification.'" Second, if the regulated conduct was in fact
protected by the Constitution, then courts should apply a means-end
scrutiny at a level that is appropriate based on the content of the law
itself.'31 The court explained that "the degree of fit required between
the means and the end will depend on how closely the law comes to
the core of the right and the severity of the law's burden on the
right."13 2 The court remanded the case because the government had
no way of knowing that it would be required to carry its burden of
proof under an intermediate scrutiny standard. When the Seventh
Circuit, sitting en banc, reheard United States v. Skoien in 2010
("Skoien II"), it upheld section 922(g)(9), arguing both that the
meaning of the Second Amendment was historically understood as
not protecting the rights of criminals to own weapons, and that the
law was substantially related to an important governmental
objective. 3
In 2011, the Fourth Circuit merged the original analogy approach
34
The case
with the Skoien approach in United States v. Masciandaro.'
involved a challenge to a federal law that prohibited carrying a loaded
weapon inside a vehicle in a national park."' The defendant claimed
that he frequently slept in his car for business trips and needed the
gun for self-defense.1' Thus, Masciandaro placed the core right of

127. United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199,1205-06 (11th Cir. 2010).
128. Skoien 1, 587 F.3d at 808.
129. In 2010, the Fourth Circuit adopted this approach in United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 2010).
130. Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 808-09.
131. Id. at 809.
132. Id.
133. United States v. Skoien (Skoien II), 614 F.3d 638, 640-45 (7th Cir. 2010).
134. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
135. Id. at 459.
136. Id. at 465.
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self-defense, established in Heller, directly at issue. Applying an
intermediate level of scrutiny, the court upheld the law as
"reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest," but also
held that the law was "analogous to the litany of state concealed carry
prohibitions specifically identified as valid in Heller."' 7 In applying
intermediate scrutiny, the court explained that the government has a
substantial interest in "providing for the safety of individuals who
visit and make use of national parks."13" Because the government will
always have such an interest, the only question to be resolved under
this framework is the limit of such an interest. This is probably what
Justice Scalia hoped to avoid when he explicitly rejected interestbalancing in Heller."

It is difficult to understand how Justice Scalia hopes to avoid all
forms of interest-balancing. In the total absence of any interestbalancing, every single law implicating the Second Amendment
would need to be justified independently using a historical analysis.
While a historical analysis reveals that the Second Amendment, as
understood at the time of ratification, protects an individual's right to
possess firearms for self-defense, it cannot speak to the laws that the
founders did not foresee. During the Founding Era, laws banning
handguns in school zones did not exist.1" Laws prohibiting ex-felons
from owning firearms emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. 4 1 It cannot be
said that these presumptively valid laws enumerated in Heller were
part of a tradition that existed in the founding era. It is clear that the
Court will need to revisit the doctrinal issues raised by Heller, but
until they do, lower courts will have to perform some form of ad hoc
analogy or interest-balancing test.
In the five months following the Heller decision, federal courts
handed down over fifty rulings on the constitutionality of gun control
laws.142 In each of those decisions, the courts upheld the challenged
law.143 Such laws have included those that prohibit ex-felons from

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
293, 309
143.

Id. at 473-74.
Id.
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
Winkler, supranote 120, at 1564.
See, e.g., Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-09 (1938) (repealed 1968).
Nelson R. Lund et al., Civil Rights: The Heller Case, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
(2009).
Id. at 309-10.
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having guns,'" and carrying guns in places such as post offices and
schools.145 These cases are simple for the courts since they fall into
the safe harbor articulated in Heller."' Courts have also upheld laws
that tend to stray away from the list of "presumptively valid" laws,
such as bans based on misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence
or laws restricting the ability of substance abusers and illegal aliens to
obtain firearms.14 An insurance mandate does not bear any of the
characteristics of the laws enumerated in Heller's safe harbor list.
However, Heller is the only Supreme Court case that clearly adopts
the individual right theory. Thus, any court faced with a Second
Amendment challenge must consider the individual right theory.
2.

The Constitutionalityof an Insurance Mandate

As a threshold matter, it must be determined whether an
insurance mandate affects a right protected by the Second
Amendment.'" The answer depends on how the issue is framed. For
instance, the question could be whether the Second Amendment
protects the right to possess a gun without purchasing insurance. If
Heller stands for the proposition that the Second Amendment
protects the right to possess guns for the purpose of self-defense, then
an insurance mandate would not necessarily interfere directly with
that right since individuals could still possess guns while complying
with the law. There is a constitutional right to travel between states,

144. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Drew, Civ. A. No. 9:08-02299-HFFBM, 2008 WL 4279565
(D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2008).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Dorosan, Crim. A. No. 08-042, 2008 WL 2622996 (E.D.
La. July 7, 2008) (upholding a ban on guns on postal property); United States v. Lewis,
Crim. No. 2008-45, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103631 (D.V.I. Dec. 24, 2008) (upholding a ban
on guns in school zones).
146. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 ("Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.")
147. See generally United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Me. 2008)
(misdemeanor domestic violence convictions); United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No.
3:08cr118, 2008 WL 4534226 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2008) (illegal aliens); United States v.
Yancey, No. 08-cr-103-bbc, 2008 WL 4534201 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2008) (substance
abusers).
148. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) ("The first
question is whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the
scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee.") (internal citations omitted).
149. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
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yet requiring a car owner to have insurance does not violate that
right.
The question becomes more difficult, however, if an insurance
mandate could effectively prohibit someone from owning a gun
altogether. Would the insurance mandate be unconstitutional if,
because of the cost, it operated as a complete deprivation of the right
to bear arms for the poor? Phrasing the issue in this manner may
result in a court applying strict scrutiny. In general, courts will apply
strict scrutiny when a law discriminates against a suspect classo or
burdens a fundamental right."' Since wealth classifications do not
trigger strict scrutiny,'52 the question becomes whether an insurance
mandate interferes with a fundamental right. In McDonald v.
Chicago, the Supreme Court held that the right to bear arms is a
fundamental right and applies to states as a right incorporated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The Court's
precedents involving wealth discrimination and fundamental rights
are instructive on this point. In Griffin v. Illinois, the Court
invalidated a state law that prevented an indigent criminal defendant
from obtaining a transcript of his trial for use on appeal.'54 Requiring
indigents to pay for their transcripts operated as a de facto
discrimination against the poor because they were completely unable
to afford them.' In Bullock v. Carter,the Court similarly invalidated
a filing-fee requirement for getting on a primary election ballot in
Texas.5 Because the fee was several thousand dollars and there were
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot," inability to
pay resulted in an absolute denial of the right to run for office."' In
sum, if an insurance mandate were to foreclose the possibility of gun
ownership for certain individuals, then there might be a legitimate
concern about the law's constitutionality.
On the other hand, the insurance mandate might pass
constitutional muster if it provides alternatives to purchasing
150. The use of strict scrutiny for certain classes of individuals was first conceived in
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
151. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
152. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) ("this Court
has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for
invoking strict scrutiny").
153. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036-42 (2010).
154. See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
155. Id. at 18.
156. See generally Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
157. Id. at 149.
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insurance.58 For example, in lieu of purchasing insurance, a gun
owner could submit to an annual mental evaluation and drug test, or
show proof that the gun is still in his or her possession. As a matter of
policy, these other reforms are generally desirable, but are often
fiscally untenable. The government would only need to provide an
opportunity for alternative compliance to gun owners who can
demonstrate an inability to afford the insurance, not to everyone."'
There likely would not be a constitutional issue posed under the
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses so long as the insurance
mandate does not result in a total disarmament of the poor. This, of
course, assumes that the insurance mandate violates the Second
Amendment only as applied to certain individuals.
The Court might find that the insurance mandate directly
interferes with the core right protected by the Second Amendment
because insurance companies declined to insure certain risks.
Applying Heller, the first question to ask is whether the conduct at
issue was understood to be within the scope of the right at the time of
ratification.'" The proposed insurance mandate would make it a
crime to possess a gun without insurance. Obviously, the Founders
would have never anticipated the issue of purchasing liability
insurance before owning a gun. Hence, a person alive at the time of
the Second Amendment's ratification would not have understood the
amendment as protecting a right to possess a gun without insurance.
A historical inquiry really provides very little insight, which leaves
courts at a stopping point. In the future, the Court will undoubtedly
need to do one of two things. The Court should either clarify why the
"presumptively valid" restrictions are valid in the first place, or the
Court should sanction at least some form of a balancing test. The
analogy approach, although useful in some cases, is superficial and
falls short of sound constitutional jurisprudence.

158. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 21 (1973) (noting that
in cases invalidating fee requirements that "no constitutional violation would have been
shown if the State had provided some 'adequate substitute"').
159. Id. at 23 (noting that the wealth discrimination cases invalidated laws as applied
to individuals whose lack of personal resources resulted in an absolute deprivation of a
right).
160. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
161. See Jeff Golimowski, Note, Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in
A Post-Heller World, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599 (2012) (advocating the use of time,
manner, and place criteria like those used in First Amendment cases in evaluating Second
Amendment challenges).
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Conclusion
Notwithstanding the doctrinal issues in Heller, the Court did not
foreclose the possibility that an insurance mandate would survive a
constitutional challenge, provided it does not result in an absolute
deprivation of the rights of lawful gun owners.'62 Ultimately, the
justification for the mandate rests in part on the idea that some
people should not be deprived of the right to own a gun. Although
gun control advocates might prefer an outright ban, such an idea
overlooks the reality that firearms can provide a legitimate means of
protection. The right of self-preservation is at the very heart of social
contract theory: We give up certain basic freedoms in order to receive
greater protections in the interest of self-preservation and personal
prosperity. Thus, if the government chooses to burden the right of
self-preservation, it should prove that the proposed laws will
nevertheless secure the safety of its constituency to a greater extent
than the constituency could itself. This logic is appealing but also
evident in our current laws that prohibit citizens from owning
extremely dangerous weapons. If average citizens could individually
own rocket launchers, they undoubtedly would have a very powerful
means of self-preservation; however, such a right would clearly make
society less safe as a whole. An insurance mandate, although
imposing a cost on the ownership of guns, would leave the right to
possess firearms for self-defense largely undisturbed.
States that are considering whether to enact an insurance
mandate for gun owners should be mindful of the fact that the Heller
decision rests on unstable grounds and that divergent approaches to
applying Heller have already emerged among the circuit courts.
States should seek ways to minimize the burden caused by the
mandate, since any form of means-end scrutiny will require balancing
the states' interest in reducing gun violence against the burden placed
on gun owners. Although Scalia eschewed the use of balancing tests
in Heller,'63 such tests are difficult to avoid, and indeed, several of the
circuit courts have embraced them.'" Thus, policymakers should

162. See Heller, 554 U.S at 636 ("The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a
variety of tools for combating that problem, including some measures regulating
handguns. But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy
choices off the table.").
163. Id. at 634-35.
164. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Chester,
628 F.3d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir.
2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2010).
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minimize the burden that an insurance mandate could cause in order
to save the law from being held unconstitutional. Since the burden is
largely financial, states should look for ways to limit the cost of
insurance by placing ceilings on the amount of administrative
expenses and shareholder dividends that insurance companies make,
or through tort reforms. Of course, one would expect that since
insurance costs are correlated with the remunerative costs of covering
the insured's liabilities, costs should decrease as firearm injuries
decrease. This means that the success of an insurance mandate may
depend on how successful gun safety reforms are in general.
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